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1. INTRODUCTION TO A PROBLEM
Egoism of a voter means supporting the proposals that meet his individual interests. On the
other hand, collectivism is to protect the interests of a certain group associated with the voter in
question. The egoist’s problem lies in the fact that, having a single vote, he is often unable to
protect personal interests. A group has more chances to succeed through solidary voting; however,
a member of the group still faces a problem. In particular, the larger (more powerful) is the group,
the greater can be the differences between the interests of the group and the individual ones of its
members. Therefore, the question “What is more beneficial for a person, i.e., playing for himself
or protecting interests of the group that may not coincide with individual ones?” is nontrivial and
has no universal answer. Similar problems arise for political parties and movements; they should
choose possible candidates for making unions and alliances, as well as evaluate opportunities for
autonomous participation in the political process.
In the case of a small group uniting participants with similar interests, collectivism of the
members gets close to egoism. Contrariwise, in a large group that approximates the size of a
society, collectivism turns out to be a version of altruism; in fact, every participant protects the
interests common for the society.
Problems of relating egoism, altruism and rationality have been studied in [1–3]; voting as a
method to make decisions regarding distribution of social benefits via income taxation and imple-
mentation of social programs has been considered in [4–7]. Democratic decisions made by egoistic
voters are easily manipulated by means of formulation of proposals; this fact has been demon-
strated in the theory of voting. In this context we should mention investigations performed, first,
by A.V. Malishevskii (1970) of the Institute of Control Sciences [8, pp. 92–95] and, second, by
R. McKelvey (1976) of the California Institute of Technology [9]; in addition, the reader is referred
to [10].
For instance, the result of a sequence of decisions made by overwhelming majority may be
disadvantageous for all voters without exception. Such manipulation is impossible with respect to
collectivists seeking to maximize the benefits of large groups. Hence, the following type of social
dynamics is an attractive area of research. Some participants form a group in order to protect their
common interests. Assume they succeed in solving this task; i.e., the average group member gets
more benefits than an egoist. Since the group is open for new members, the group size increases.
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If the group remains successful under the growth, then there is no obstacle to further expansion,
up to the size of the community; during the growth, the egoism of the group approaches altruism.
As Arthur Koestler states, “The egoism of the group feeds on the altruism of its members;” some
years earlier, the same idea was expressed by Reinhold Niebuhr. The phenomenon under study is
an instance of the inverse transformation.
We have analyzed the corresponding effects using mathematical models in several papers. In
particular, it has been shown in [11–13] that, for large domains in the parameter space of the model
under consideration, the group can successfully (in terms of the utility of its members) compete
with individual participants. This fact points to the practicability of the growing “snowball”
of cooperation, the type of social dynamics mentioned above. At the same time, under certain
conditions, the group looses, and it is more profitable to behave individually.
In order to further investigate the benefits and effective mechanisms of cooperative behavior,
one should consider the case where the group competes not only with individual participants, but
also with other groups (“parties”). The subject of the present paper is to analyze the case of two
rival groups.
2. MODEL AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A model suitable for the study of the collectivist and egoistic strategies should possess the
following features. It should be sufficiently rich to describe the basic elements of reality being
modeled and sufficiently simple to allow the use of analytical methods.
The framework of the model should allow to formalize the following key notions: the inter-
ests of participants, cooperation, the interests of groups, profitability, variable environment, social
opportunities and challenges, making and implementing collective decisions.
The basic assumptions of the model we propose are as follows.
(1) The current state of every participant is characterized by a quantitative indicator that may
be viewed as the level of welfare, capital, utility, social role, satisfaction, success, etc. For
brevity, we use a capital-like interpretation of this indicator in the sequel. The indicator may
have both positive and negative values. The model allows to specify the initial values of the
indicator for all the participants.
(2) An egoistic participant is interested in maximizing his capital.
(3) Participants may form groups.
(4) The success of a group is described by nondecreasing functions in the capitals of the members.
(5) The social dynamics under study is determined by collective decisions made through voting
involving all participants.
(6) To make decisions, the α-majority procedure is used; the parameter α determines the number
of votes necessary and sufficient to accept a proposal. E.g., α = 0.5 describes the procedure
of simple majority vote. If a proposal is rejected, status quo is preserved, i.e., the capitals of
the participants remain the same.
(7) While voting, every egoistic participant supports precisely the proposals increasing his capital
(this item makes item (2) more exact).
(8) The members of each group vote together. We consider several group criteria of supporting
proposals, viz., (a) the criterion of α-majority (with a threshold α1 that may differ from the
general vote threshold) and (b) a sufficiently high level of the average capital increment for
the members of the group (e.g., exceeding 0).
(9) Proposal is modeled by the vector of capital increments of all the participants.
(10) As a generator of proposals we consider realizations of a random vector with independent
identically distributed components. The proposals are interpreted as opportunities produced
by a stochastic environment, which can be favorable, neutral or unfavorable.
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(11) As the distribution of a capital increment we use Gaussian distribution N(µ, σ2). Parameters
µ and σ characterize the environment, i.e., µ > 0, µ = 0 and µ < 0 correspond to a
favorable, neutral and unfavorable environment, respectively; σ stands for the variability of
the environment.
(12) Various modifications of the model are analyzed. They differ in the conditions of joining and
leaving groups, as well as in the conditions of leaving the game for those participants who
went bankrupt (have negative capital accounts), possible influence of the capital value on the
capital increment, etc. In addition, other voting rules and principles to generate and support
proposals are considered.
The main subject of investigation is social dynamics defined by collective decisions under the
assumptions listed above. In particular, we analyze
• comparative benefits of different social strategies including egoism and collectivism with respect
to both the participants and the whole society;
• relations between the results and the parameters of the model, including the levels of favor and
variation in the environment, voting thresholds, supporting principles for the proposals, the
ratio of participants with different strategies, and so on.
Special attention is paid to the interpretation of the results in social terms.
This paper is mostly dedicated to the case where participants are divided into three categories,
namely, egoists and the members of two groups (“parties”).
3. “SNOWBALL” OF COOPERATION
One of the major problems of social reality can be formulated as follows. Egoistic behavior of
social agents often leads to rather regrettable results. Falling into trouble or having a need of sup-
port, a pure egoist gets no assistance. In addition, faced with the slightest bit organized opposition,
the egoist usually turns out to be powerless. Generally speaking, altruistic behavior is more prof-
itable for the society until it is typical for the absolute majority of participants. Otherwise, altruists
only have a sense of moral right while the remaining dividends are distributed among less noble
members. In other words, altruism provides a beneficial equilibrium which is extremely unstable.
In modern society, one can observe altruism that in the least could be considered wide-spread, in
the sphere of symbolic actions; they include demonstration of courtesy, attentiveness (sometimes
in the way reminiscent of the popular ignorant heroes of Russian literature, Mr. Bobchinskii and
Mr. Dobchinskii, described by the famous Russian writer N.V. Gogol’). Other examples of altru-
ism can be found in areas where the interests of the participant in question are not appreciably
affected (for instance, philanthropy). With coming commercialization, even the “noble professions”
gradually lose their special status. We should mention important exceptions such as the rules of
conduct in emergency (in a shipwreck, women and children should be saved first, etc.), although
not always these rules are followed. In general, altruism remains the prerogative of noble people,
whose number is few in any era.
It appears that no changes towards altruism can be found in international politics. As before,
foreign policy of any government is to protect the interests of the state it represents; this often leads
to cynical attitude towards the interests of other nations. Domestic policy has similar tendencies
when representatives of elected authorities, even protecting the interests of the electorate, are often
willing to ignore interests of other citizens.
The above political examples give samples of corporate (cooperative) behavior. A representative
of a state (or a community, or a corporation) protects the interests of his community that competes
with the others. We should emphasize that consideration of the complete range of social strategies
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from egoism to altruism makes it possible to give examples of cooperative behavior that correspond
to every segment of this range.
As has been noted, the case of cooperative behavior within an opened and competitive (and,
thus, increasing) union of participants, deserves particular attention. As soon as the union increases,
cooperative behavior tends to altruistic one. This social mechanism may be referred to as “snezhnyi
kom kooperatsii” (“snowball” of cooperation). In jest, setting hopes on it may be termed “snezhnyi
kom”-munizm (“snowball communism”). In the following sections, we study the model described
in Section 2.
4. WHEN IS THE “SNOWBALL” GROWING AND WHEN IS IT MELTING?
First of all, consider a society consisting of social agents of two types, egoists and group members.
Let us ask a question on how the benefits of the group, the egoists and the whole society depend
on group size.
Formulas obtained in [12] provide a complete answer to this question. The approximate expres-
sions presented in the theorem below are less cumbersome than the precise ones; the approximation
introduces acceptably small errors, with the only exception in the case of small groups, where we
use accurate formulas. In the following theorem, a pair of values in square brackets stands for a
row matrix or a column matrix, while ⌊θn⌋ denotes the integer part of θn.
Theorem [12]. Let M(d˜ε) and M(d˜G) be the mathematical expectations of the one-step capital
increments for the egoists and group members, respectively. Suppose that the group supports a
proposal if and only if this proposal ensures a positive increment of the total group capital. Then
the standard normal approximation of the binomial distribution provides the following expressions:
M(d˜ε) ≈ [PG QG]
(
µ
[
Fγ
Fα
]
+
σf√
pqℓ
[
fγ
fα
])
,
M(d˜G) ≈ [Fγ Fα]
(
µ
[
PG
QG
]
+
σfG√
g
[
1
−1
])
,
(1)
where PG = F
(
µ
√
g
σ
)
, QG = 1− PG = F
(
−µ
√
g
σ
)
, Fθ = F
(
−⌊θn⌋+ 0.5 − pℓ√
pqℓ
)
, fθ =
f
(⌊θn⌋+ 0.5− pℓ√
pqℓ
)
, θ ∈ {α, γ}, γ = α− g/n, p = F (µ/σ), q = 1− p, fG = f(µ√g/σ),
f = f (µ/σ), F (·) and f(·) are the standard normal distribution function and the corresponding
density function, ℓ and g denote the number of egoists and the group size, respectively, and n = ℓ+g
is the number of participants.
A typical example of the relationship between one-step capital increments of the participants
and the group size is given by Fig. 1. In this example, the society consists of 1000 agents; the x-axis
refers to the group size (in the range between 0 and 1000). The group members vote as stated in
the theorem above. The parameters of the distribution of proposals are: µ = −0.8 and σ = 30; the
voting threshold is α = 0.5. On the ordinate, the average (expected) one-step capital increments
for a group member, an egoist and a randomly selected participant are plotted.
It should be noted that the group, irrespective of its size, has a significant advantage over the
egoists. Therefore, it is profitable for the egoists to join the group. The members of a small group
gain a lot of benefits from increasing the group size. On the contrary, expansion of a small group is
not profitable for the egoists and the whole society. In the example under consideration, the most
profitable (for the group members) size of the group is 50 persons. Further expansion of the group
AUTOMATION AND REMOTE CONTROL Vol. 71 No. 6 2010
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Fig. 1. Average one-step capital increments for: (1) a group member, (2) an egoist and (3) a randomly selected
participant: 1000 participants (the group and egoists); µ = −0.8, σ = 30, α = 0.5.
leads to the decrease of the average capital increments of the participants. However, starting from
88 members, further expansion of the group becomes profitable for the whole society, and starting
from 102 members, it is beneficial for the egoists either. The whole society enters the domain of
positive average capital increments with 488 members of the group and it reaches the one-step
capital increment typical of the group-free case when the group has 649 members.
This leads to the following conclusion, which is relevant in the design of control algorithms. If
the “rules of play” are established by those interested in maximizing the total capital of the society,
then the group should be open to new members. Then a likely scenario is that all participants join
the group and thereby the group egoism becomes a version of altruism. Note that this altruism is
conditional: should any member start voting for his personal interests conflicting with the interests
of the group, and the rest of the group will stop protecting this member’s interests. In other words,
“all for one” as long as “one for all.” It is precisely this condition that ensures the stability of
“cooperative” (reciprocal, in the terminology of Robert Trivers) altruism; this stability distinguishes
it from the “absolute” one (also called hard-core altruism).
Now imagine that the “rules of play” are determined by the participants themselves. In this
case, every participant is interested in such a minimum ceiling of group size that exceeds 49 and
guarantees the presence of this participant within the group. If the group already has 50 members,
then they will seek to draw a line (i.e., do not invite new members). In this case, the group
constitutes a “solid elite” that resembles the party in a one-party political system. The existence
of such a group is unprofitable to the whole society; but the worse is when the group exceeds its
(internally) optimal size. In the example under consideration, the minimum value of the total social
capital is reached when the group contains 88 members.
Certainly, in addition to attempts to join the group, which is de facto an “elite,” there exists
an alternative and more natural strategy: it consists in organizing a competitive group. The
consequences are discussed in Section 5.
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5. THE SECOND “SNOWBALL”
Let the group reach its internally optimal size; assume that further expansion is blocked. Con-
sider the organization of the second group. The analysis techniques we use involve, on the one
hand, a simulation model implemented on a computer and, on the other hand, analytical expres-
sions analogous to Eqs. (1) and too cumbersome to be presented here. Figure 2 demonstrates how
the expected one-step capital increments of the egoists, the members of two groups and randomly
chosen participants depend on the size of the second group.
It is easily seen that the expansion of the second group is extremely disadvantageous for the
first one: it causes a swift decrease of the average capital increments of the first group. The
capital increment of the second group member, per contra, grows reaching its maximum level at
96 members. In the present example, this maximum level is 72% of that for the sole first group.
If the second group further expands via the addition of egoists, the advantage of the first group
over the egoists vanishes; this happens as the size of the second group approaches 150 members.
The continued addition of the egoists to the second group (which reduces its “elitism”) is profitable
for them, for the remaining egoists, for the first group and for the whole society. The first group
attains its minimum level of average capital increment when the second one has 144 members.
Thus, for a single group, it is beneficial to have a small size; if two groups compete, it is the
larger one that wins. However, the winning group is not interested in exceeding the other one by
a factor of more than 2–2.5.
Let us stress the following point. In the presence of two competing groups, the egoists benefit
the most when the groups compete “as equals;” i.e., the average capital increment of an egoist is
maximal when the groups have the same size. A political counterpart of this situation is the two-
party system with the parties having the same vote share. In the above example, such a situation
is optimal for the “unorganized” part of the society. The mechanism of this phenomenon is as
follows: the closer are the parties in their power, the more they value the votes of “unorganized”
citizens. Accordingly, the greater is the impact of those votes on the decisions being made. In the
Fig. 2. Average one-step capital increments for: (1) a member of the first group, (2) a member of the second
group, (3) an egoist, (4) a randomly selected participant. The community of 1000 participants includes
50 members in the first group, the second group and egoists; µ = −0.8, σ = 30, α = 0.5.
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present example, the situation where one of the groups considerably outnumbers the other is even
slightly worse for the egoists than the presence of only one group having the combined size of those
two.
6. TWO “SNOWBALLS” THAT GROW TOGETHER
In Section 5 we have established the fact that an existing group loses to another one that has
just appeared and has a higher rate of size increase. A conclusion is: with the appearance of the
second group, the first one should not “freeze” its size. On the contrary, it should strive to maintain
its advantage in size. Consider the case where two groups are characterized by the same rate of
size increase, with the first group having 50 extra members. A corresponding example is shown in
Fig. 3.
As could be expected, the first group succeeds in keeping a dominant position over the second
one using such a policy. With the increase of the group size, the average capital increment of a
Group 1 member is reduced five times, but it still remains much higher than the increments of
the other participants (which do not leave the domain of negative values). During this process,
the increment of the whole society goes up, because the leading group becomes less “elite.” In the
very beginning, the average capital increment of a Group 2 member grows swiftly; however, it soon
reaches its maximum (approximately, −0.1 at 10 members) and starts to decrease, reaching the
minimum value of −0.245. Within this segment, the benefit of the second group is even less than
that of the egoists; with further growth of the groups, it slightly increases. In fact, the second group
goes broke since it loses to the more powerful first group in votes almost always. The difference in
50 votes is so significant that only in extremely rare cases it can be compensated by the votes of
the egoists.
In contrast to this, if the difference between the groups is small (say, 5 members instead of 50),
then the dynamics is quite different, cf. Fig. 4.
Fig. 3. Average one-step capital increments for: (1) a member of the first group, (2) a member of the second
group, (3) an egoist and (4) a randomly selected participant. The society consists of 1000 participants; the
first group has 50 extra participants compared to the second one; µ = −0.8, σ = 30, α = 0.5.
AUTOMATION AND REMOTE CONTROL Vol. 71 No. 6 2010
ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVISM AND EGOISM PHENOMENA 1203
Fig. 4. Average one-step capital increments for: (1) a member of the first group, (2) a member of the second
group, (3) an egoist and (4) a randomly selected participant. The society consists of 1000 participants; the
first group has 5 extra participants compared to the second one; µ = −0.8, σ = 30, α = 0.5.
In addition to other status of the second group, we would like to attract the reader’s attention to
the curve of the average capital increment of an egoist: in particular, it has a “rise” and a “drop”
in the right-hand side of the diagram in Fig. 4. A well-known effect consisting in the advantages of
a “small party” in the presence of two greater ones having an approximate balance can be observed
here. The egoists are uncoordinated; nevertheless, when they are few and none of the groups is able
to secure a majority, the society mainly accepts the proposals supported by a substantial proportion
of the egoists. Naturally, this situation is profitable for them. This explains the “rise” of the average
capital increment of the egoists and their advantage over both groups in the corresponding segment.
However, when the number of egoists is less than 5, all decisions are simply made by the first group;
thus the capital increment of this group goes up while the curves describing the benefits of the other
participants go down. Interestingly, the minimum capital increment of a society member is reached
when the second group has the size (i.e., 40 participants) approximately twice that (though the
absolute difference is moderate) providing the maximum capital increments for the groups (22 and
23 members, respectively). This dynamics is similar to that shown in Fig. 1. The maximum level
of the society’s capital increment is observed when the two groups, as well as the egoists, compete
most intensively and “as equals” (the corresponding size of the second group is 367 members).
When the size of the second group reaches 384, the benefit of the egoist “catches up” the one of a
randomly selected participant. The formulas we derived allow one to elucidate the mechanism of
the above phenomena (as well as some others). However, keeping within the limits of this paper
makes it impossible to discuss the point in detail.
7. TWO “BALLS OF WOOL”
Now let us consider the case where redistribution of participants between two groups does not
involve egoists, i.e., the sum of the two group sizes, as well as the number of egoists, remain constant.
A corresponding example is shown in Fig. 5; the x-axis refers to the size of the first group; with the
size of the second group it adds up to 1000. The society consists of the two groups and 500 egoists.
Other parameters are: µ = −0.8, σ = 100, α = 2/3 (a qualified majority).
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In contrast to “snowball,” this scenario resembles the hourglass or two balls of wool with a
shared thread, viz., what is wound off the first ball is wound on the second one.
The results presented in Fig. 5 are somewhat unexpected; below we comment them.
To accept a proposal, 1001 votes are needed. If the first group has more than 780 members
and supports a proposal, then the remaining votes (no more than 220) are usually provided by
the egoists; the proposal cannot be accepted without the support of the first group. Therefore, in
this size segment, the first group has a high level of average capital increments. If the size of the
first group is increased in the range of 780 to 1000 members, then its average capital increment is
reduced. The reason is that the larger is the group, the smaller the frequency of its satisfaction with
the proposals will be. Along with this, the average capital increments of its members measuring this
satisfaction are decreased. If the group includes 720 to 780 members, then, provided that it supports
a proposal, the egoists often fail to supply the remaining votes. However, if the egoists manage
to bring those votes, then the proposal, which is quite profitable for them, will be accepted. That
is why the segment in question is remarkable for top capital increments of the egoists. Moreover,
when the size of the first group belongs to [720, 750] and this group supports a proposal, the
lacking votes are often provided by the second group, which gains from this; therefore the capital
increments of the second group are significant here. In the segment [750, 780], the remaining votes
are more and more frequently provided by the egoists, which results in a great drop of the capital
increment of the second group. In [280, 720], almost all accepted proposals are supported by both
groups. This situation is more favorable for the smaller one since, according to the law of averages,
its satisfaction, in the mean, is expressed by greater levels of capital increment. At the same time,
this segment is more favorable for the egoists than [780, 1000] as far as here, the number of accepted
proposals having negative average capital increments for the egoists is smaller. The cause is that
here, to accept such a proposal, the agreement of both groups is required, whereas for the segment
[780, 1000], the support of the first group is sufficient. The segment [220, 280] is symmetric to
[720, 780]. The segment [0, 220] is characterized by the fact that almost all proposals favorable
Fig. 5. Average one-step capital increments for: (1) member of the first group, (2) member of the second
group, (3) egoist and (4) randomly selected participant: 1500 participants, the first and the second group have
1000 members totally; µ = −0.8, σ = 100, α = 2/3.
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to the second group are accepted here and so the first group and the egoists cannot protect their
interests.
Let us note that the two-party system with the parties having equal powers is very stable in
the present example. Indeed, if two groups have 450 and 550 members, then the members of the
larger group will gain some benefits from joining the smaller one since the latter has advantages.
This leads to the size of the groups becoming almost equal with the lapse of time. However, the
stable two-party system is not the most profitable for the egoists and the whole society. The matter
is that, due to a high voting threshold, the votes of the egoists do not allow any party to secure
the acceptance of a beneficial proposal without the support by the second party. Therefore, the
interest of egoists is actually ignored here. Their votes are highly demanded when the groups have
approximately 750 and 250 members. In this case, to accept a proposal beneficial to the egoists,
it is sufficient to enlist the support of the larger group. On the contrary, to accept a proposal
disadvantageous (at the average) to the egoists, both groups must support it, which is far less
probable. Thus the egoists have the maximum capital increments when the first group includes
250 or 750 members.
8. CONCLUSION
The real state of things is much more intricate than the simple model considered in this paper;
in particular, there exist many subjective factors that have not been taken into account within
the framework of the model. Nevertheless, analysis of the model allows identification of certain
hidden mechanisms of social processes. The model can serve as a “zero-order approximation” that
highlights many relevant phenomena, e.g., benefits of the two-party system with parties having
almost the same power, advantages of a small party in the presence of two rival large parties, and
so on. The model may be implemented with respect to a society, a parliament, a collective, etc.,
provided that the distribution of power and the decision-making procedures are known; analysis
of the model enables one to understand the special features of the social system under study
and, possibly, to optimize its performance. The results of such analysis are sometimes difficult to
forecast; even a few examples discussed above give an indication of the numerous types of system
performance that can be implemented by varying the model parameters.
The “snowball” of cooperation is the central metaphor of the paper; it refers to the group that
efficiently protects the interests of its members and is open to new members. Through its expansion,
such a group becomes more altruistic.
It turns out, however, that, starting from a certain group size, further expansion of the group
may become disadvantageous for its members by causing a decrease of the capital increments. From
this point on, the interests of the group and of the remaining participants diverge. This phenomenon
was studied in Section 4; it is related to many actual economic and political situations (for example,
to the problem of dividing the Arctic shelf among the competing states).
When the members of a group are not interested in its expansion, a rival group can be organized.
As was demonstrated in Section 5, the primary group loses if during this process it tries to “freeze”
its optimal size. Contrariwise, to maintain a dominant position, this group should grow; the rate
of this growth should be moderate (see Section 6). The case of two large groups having almost the
same size turns out to be beneficial for the “unorganized” members of the society, provided that
the decisions are made by simple majority. For the whole society, the most beneficial situation
is reaching consensus; in the absence of consensus the society should aim at the situations of real
competition involving all participants. This conclusion should be taken into account while designing
control algorithms for social and economic systems.
Finally, Section 7 was devoted to the analysis of the “interchange” of members between two
groups. It might seem surprising that the members of a smaller group have more benefits than
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the members of the larger one. Such a phenomenon can ensure the stability of the two-party
system with parties of almost the same size. The “unorganized” part of the society naturally has
the highest benefit when its votes are highly demanded. It has been shown that such a situation
occurs not only in the two-party system with equal parties; some unbalanced situations may also
be profitable for the egoists, especially, under qualified majority voting systems.
This paper does not claim to provide a systematic description of all types of social dynamics
implemented within the framework of the model; the limits of a short article make such a description
impossible. Our task was to consider a few typical examples which are relevant to social issues.
Getting back to the “snowball” of cooperation, let us emphasize that there exist many cases
where the members of an alliance have no reason to “freeze” its size. In particular, this is apparently
typical of international cooperation on global problems such as the problem of reducing emissions
into the atmosphere. The members of such an alliance implement joint projects for the sake of
the alliance and, to some extent, of the other counties. Since this activity does not contradict
the interests of the third parties, the alliance is typically interested in its further expansion. On
the other hand, in situations where an alliance (an “elite”) is concerned with limiting its size, its
openness can be established as a standard as far as it meets the interests of the society. In all
cases mentioned above the mechanism of “snowball” of cooperation can be used to create stable
“conditionally altruistic” communities (see Section 4). Notably, this mechanism can be involved in
the development of civil society, which is one of the main problems of today (see, e.g., [14]). This
relies on the fact that the cells of civil society benefit from joining associations that maintain a
high level of solidarity and coordinate their actions.
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